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1 
A RESEARCH EXEMPTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
Introduction 
On March 20, 2015, Robert Kastenmeier, who represented 
Wisconsin’s Second Congressional District from 1959 to 1991, passed 
away at his home in Arlington, Virginia.1  Though Kastenmeier may not 
have been well known outside of legislative circles and his home state of 
Wisconsin, he was in fact one of the most prolific policy makers—if not 
the most prolific policy maker—in the field of intellectual property law 
in the 20th century.  He is impressively credited with authoring more 
than forty-eight laws dealing with intellectual property matters during 
his legislative tenure, including the Copyright Act of 1976, which 
remains the primary legal framework for copyright law in the United 
States.2 
One of the last bills that Kastenmeier introduced in the House of 
Representatives was a major piece of patent reform legislation dubbed 
the Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990 
(PCTIA).3  Kastenmeier introduced the bill on September 20, 1990, but 
left office less than four months later on January 3, 1991, after losing an 
election to Scott Klug.  The PCTIA contained five separate titles, and 
dealt with subjects as varied as the patentability of inventions made in 
outer space to the repeal of state sovereign immunity from infringement 
liability.4  One of those titles, Title IV, garnered little attention at the 
time, but addressed a subject of tremendous importance today: the need 
to codify and strengthen the long-standing common law research 
exemption in American patent law. 
I have written elsewhere about the political economy of the research 
exemption in American patent law from 1970 to the present day, with an 
emphasis on analyzing the political coalitions that have historically 
argued in favor of or against such exemptions, and the economic 
arguments they often invoke.5  The purpose of this article, in contrast, is 
to carry forward the torch that Kastenmeier lit, and argue in favor of 
codifying a robust research exemption.  To that end, section two briefly 
                                                     
 1. Adam Clymer, Robert Kastenmeier, Liberal Voice in House for 32 Years, Dies at 91, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/us/robert-kastenmeier-
liberal-house-voice-dies-at-91.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See generally Nicholas Short, The Political Economy of the Research Exemption in 
American Patent Law, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 573 (2016). 
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explains how the law pertaining to research exemptions has developed 
since 1970, with an eye towards understanding what these developments 
mean for policy makers.  Section three summarizes the findings of 
relevant survey evidence and statistical studies.  Section four critiques 
several scholarly proposals for a research exemption or proposals that 
attempt to accomplish similar ends through different means, like the 
proposal for creating a “fair use” exception in patent law, or for 
modifying the Bayh-Dole Act to give federal funding agencies more 
discretion when determining whether the results of publicly-funded 
research should be patented.  Section five concludes by summarizing the 
basic argument in favor of the Robert Kastenmeier Memorial Act, a new 
bill to codify a robust research exemption in American patent law. 
The Current Legal Framework 
The first thing to know about the research exemption in American 
patent law is that there are, in fact, three separate exemptions. One 
exemption is rooted in the common law, and the other two have a 
statutory basis.  Supreme Court Justice Story first articulated the 
common law exemption (also known as the experimental use defense) in 
a case dating back to 1813.6 Despite this exemption’s deep historical 
origins, as well as broad application to all types of patentable subject 
matter, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recently 
interpreted the doctrine in a narrow fashion.7  As a result, the common 
law exemption “does not immunize use [of a patented invention] that is 
in any way commercial in nature” nor “any conduct that is in keeping 
with the alleged infringer’s legitimate business,” even if that business is 
research or education with no commercial intent.8  To borrow the 
Federal Circuit’s own phrasing, the common law exemption continues to 
exist, albeit “in a very limited form.”9 
The first statutory research exemption in American patent law was 
created in 1970 upon the passing of the Plant Variety Protection Act 
(PVPA), which conferred patent-like protection to novel varieties of 
plants that reproduce sexually.10  Like the common law exemption 
though, this exemption offers few benefits today.  In 1985, an 
administrative patent law board determined that those who invent novel 
varieties of sexually reproduced plants can obtain a normal utility patent 
under the Patent Act and need not seek the special protection of the 
                                                     
 6. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
 7. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 8. Id. at 1362. 
 9. Id. at 1360. 
 10. S. 3070, 91st Cong. (1970). 
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PVPA.11  The Supreme Court sanctioned this view in 2001.12 As a result 
of the Court’s decision, two completely separate statutory schemes 
govern the patentability of sexually reproduced plants.  Justice Breyer’s 
dissent correctly noted that the majority’s decision effectively destroyed 
the PVPA’s research exemption because inventors will always choose 
protection under the Patent Act over the PVPA.13 
The second statutory exemption in American patent law was created 
in 1984 with passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act and also applies to a 
limited range of inventions, specifically pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices.14 In contrast to the common law and PVPA exemptions, the 
pharmaceutical exemption still remains in effect today, and while narrow 
in terms of subject matter, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
exemption to be quite expansive in terms of the types of activity the 
exemption protects.15  Overall then, when it comes to the research 
exemption, American patent law currently has: a “very limited” common 
law exemption; a statutory exemption for the few who still seek 
protection under the PVPA; and a strong exemption for drug patents. 
For policy makers, a couple key facts about the legal landscape 
stand out.  First, for more than twenty years, the pharmaceutical industry 
has been the one industry where patents arguably play a more important 
role than other economic incentives, such as first-mover advantages, in 
facilitating research investments. That same industry has also operated 
under an unusually strong and broad research exemption, even by 
international standards, since 1984.  Though there is considerable debate 
among economists and other social scientists as to whether patents 
actually do more harm than good when it comes to innovation and 
research across the economy,16 there is somewhat more consensus for 
                                                     
 11. Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, *2-3 (B.P.A.I. 1985). 
 12. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001). 
 13. Id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court has advanced no sound reason why 
Congress would want to destroy the exemptions in the PVPA that Congress created. And the 
Court’s reading would destroy those exemptions.”). Those who obtain plant patents under the Patent 
Act are, of course, still subject to the “very limited” common law exemption described above. 
 14. The Federal Circuit had the misfortune of attempting, for the first time, to narrow the 
common law exemption in a pharmaceuticals case while Congress was debating the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.  Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  Congress 
quickly amended the Act to repeal that decision. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 26 (1984), as 
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2710. 
 15. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (holding that the 
exemption applies to exploratory research and early-stage experimentation). 
 16. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. OF ECON. 
PERSP., Winter 2013 at 1, 5 (finding “weak or no evidence that strengthening patent regimes 
increases innovation,” based on a review of 24 separate studies); see also Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. 
Patent System In Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y  531, 
531 (2000). 
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the idea that patents play an important role in drug research.17  Yet drug 
research in America is also a broadly protected activity. 
Paradoxically, the law currently offers less protection for research 
and development in the myriad industries where patents arguably play a 
small to negligible role in promoting innovation and investment 
compared to pharmaceuticals, and where such an exemption would 
therefore be less disruptive to the underlying economic incentives. The 
National Science Foundation estimates that American firms increased 
drug research spending from $5.5 billion to more than $17 billion 
between 1980 and 2003. Additionally, PhRMA, an advocacy group for 
pharmaceutical firms, estimates that total drug research spending 
conducted in the United States by foreign and domestic firms increased 
from $6 billion to $39 billion between 1980 and 2004.18  These numbers 
obviously do not provide a counter-factual for comparison, or suggest 
what levels of spending we would have observed in the absence of an 
exemption.  But they do suggest that drug research investments 
consistently and substantially increased for at least 20 years despite the 
broad statutory exemption for drug research.  Few if any scholars have 
confronted this basic fact about the drug research exemption in 
American patent law. 
Second, the current legal framework also suffers from unnecessary 
complexity in part because Congress has historically dealt with the 
statutory exemptions in a piecemeal (subject matter-specific) fashion, 
and in part because Congress has failed to codify the common law 
exemption and has left that doctrine’s interpretation to the judicial 
branch.19  The complexity of having three separate exemptions is 
compounded by the fact that, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
public universities currently enjoy immunity from all forms of patent 
infringement liability (including research-based activity) while private 
universities do not.20  Similarly, state agencies conducting research and 
development enjoy immunity while federal agencies do not, even though 
the former do much less research than the latter.21  A major benefit of 
Congressional action would be to simplify the law and treat all research 
                                                     
 17. F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 71 J. 
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 171-75 (2009).  This point is by no means settled.  See 
Boldrin and Levine, supra note 16, at 13-14. 
 18. Congressional Budget Office, Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
Pub. No. 2589, at 7-8 (October 2006). 
 19. The Federal Circuit’s institutional bias against equitable doctrines, like the research 
exemption, means that absent Supreme Court oversight, policy will continue to be made by a Court 
adverse to research exemptions. 
 20. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 
(1999); see also Short, supra note 5, at  596. 
 21. Id.  The federal government has abrogated its own immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498. 
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institutions equally when it comes to immunity from infringement 
liability for research activity. 
Studies for Guiding Policy 
To date, no studies have directly attempted to measure the causal 
impact of a research exemption on research or innovation.  That is to 
say, no studies have attempted to measure how the implementation or 
codification of a research exemption—whether general or subject 
matter-specific, whether in the United States or elsewhere—influences 
research expenditures or proxies for innovation outcomes (like new drug 
applications) while controlling for temporal trends and effects not due to 
the exemption.22  This is an area of ongoing inquiry. 
However, some survey evidence and a handful of statistical studies 
that deal with the overall impact of patents on research and innovation 
do provide some data to consider in connection with the debate over the 
research exemption.  For example, one notable survey found that 
proliferating patent rights rarely prevent biomedical researchers from 
moving forward,23 but only because researchers routinely adopt a series 
of strategies for coping with the complex patent landscape.24  And most 
of these coping strategies—including willful infringement, sending 
research offshore, and litigation—are not necessarily desirable as a 
matter of public policy.  Other surveys report similar results among 
scientists generally, and not just biomedical researchers.25 
On the subject of willful infringement, John P. Walsh and his co-
authors note that university researchers “have a reputation for routinely 
ignoring patents in the course of their research,” and sometimes invoke a 
research exemption as a basis for doing so, perhaps unaware that the 
Federal Circuit has significantly narrowed the application of that 
doctrine.26  Walsh and his co-authors also found that “[a] third of the 
industrial respondents (and all nine university or government lab 
respondents) acknowledged occasionally using patented research tools 
                                                     
 22. But see Kevin Iles, A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Experimental Use Exemptions 
in Patent Law on Incentives to Innovate, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 61 (2005) (making a 
general argument based on patent statistics that research exemptions do not seem to drive research 
off-shore). 
 23. Scientists doing clinical research based on diagnostic tests are one major exception. See 
JOHN P. WALSH, ASHISH ARORA & WESLEY M. COHEN, EFFECTS OF RESEARCH TOOL PATENTS 
AND LICENSING ON BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION, IN PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 
318 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1071. 
 24. Walsh et al., supra note 23, at 331-32. 
 25. Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 1066-69. 
 26. Walsh et al., supra note 23, at 324-25.   
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without a license, and most respondents suggested that infringement by 
others is widespread.”27  The findings make a compelling case for 
codifying the research exemption, as the law in its current form is clearly 
forcing many American researchers to operate outside of the law in 
order to continue pushing the boundaries of scientific and technological 
development. 
Another troublesome finding is that many research institutions are 
willing to send research offshore to avoid the reach of U.S. patents on 
research tools or inputs.28  In this regard, research institutions can exploit 
the fact that holders of U.S. patents may not elect to obtain foreign 
equivalent patents in every potential research venue, and the fact that 
many other countries, including most major trading partners of the U.S., 
have codified some form of a research exemption that provides more 
protection for research activity (outside of pharmaceuticals) than U.S. 
law does.29  Thus, in its current form, American patent law may not 
necessarily inhibit the progress of scientific investigation within the 
global research community, but because American law is so far out of 
step with international standards, it may indirectly cause foreign 
researchers to gain a competitive advantage on the technological cutting 
edge. This result is, on a very general level, inimical to the basic tenets 
of American economic policy. 
Walsh and his co-authors also found that researchers “worked 
around” problems with patents by negotiating a license or litigating over 
the patent’s validity, both activities that impose significant costs and 
delays on research institutions.30  Nearly one-third of the survey 
respondents indicated “that the process of sifting through a large number 
of potentially relevant patents and subsequent negotiations was very 
time consuming,” and imposed significant costs and delays on many 
biomedical researchers.31  Walsh and his co-authors also noted that, 
setting potential damage awards aside, the costs of engaging in patent 
litigation can be significant, often ranging from one to ten million dollars 
in attorney’s fees alone for each party to the lawsuit (this study was 
published in 2003).32  Such estimates ignore the true opportunity cost of 
                                                     
 27. Id. at 327. 
 28. Id. at 328. 
 29. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use 
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 37-39 
(describing developments in German and Japanese law); KENNETH A. OYE & RACHEL 
WELLHAUSEN, THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS AND PROPERTY IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, IN 
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: THE TECHNOSCIENCE AND ITS SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES 129-130 (Marcus 
Schmidt ed., 2009) (indicating that “Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the UK are among countries with 
research exemptions on protected property”). 
 30. Walsh et al., supra note 23, at 322-31. 
 31. Id. at 315. 
 32. Id. 
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litigation, which makes significant demands on the time of an 
institution’s executives and scientists.33  Another study found that in 
1999 the total spent on patent litigation in the United States, across all 
technological settings, exceeded $16 billion.34 
The high costs associated with patent licensing negotiations and 
litigation is a problem with many roots and potential solutions (and, in 
some settings, it is not necessarily a problem in the first instance).  But 
for purposes of assessing the merits of the research exemption, the more 
important question is: why are private and public institutions 
increasingly bearing these costs at the research and development phase? 
The answer, according to a handful of recent statistical studies, is 
that in a setting of cumulative innovation—where each invention is an 
input to further work—patent owners have the ability to significantly 
stifle follow-on research and innovation, and they are using that power 
to slow the pace of technological progress.  One such study focuses on 
the agreements that the National Institutes of Health negotiated with 
DuPont in the late 1990s over the oncomouse, a patented mouse 
genetically-modified to be predisposed to developing cancer.35  Under 
those agreements, DuPont had to make oncomice available to academic 
cancer researchers on a royalty-free basis with no reach-through rights 
on subsequent innovations,36 thus putting an end to DuPont’s restrictive 
licensing practices.37  The authors found that the “openness shock” 
created by the agreements significantly increased levels of follow-on 
research according to a variety of proxies, with annual citations 
increasing by twenty-one percent.38 
Another study used similar methods to determine whether patent-
like contractual provisions inhibited genetic research during the race to 
sequence the human genome.39  The author concluded that the patent-
like protection at issue “generated economically and statistically 
significant reductions in subsequent scientific research and product 
development, on the order of 20–30 percent” for multiple measures of 
innovation outcomes and found some evidence that the damage was 
                                                     
 33. Id. 
 34. JAMES BESSEN AND MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 15-16 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 2008). 
 35. Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on 
Innovation 3-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14819, 2009) 
 36. Reach-through rights are claims on subsequent inventions developed through use of the 
licensed invention.  DuPont, for example, did not just demand royalties for use of the oncomice (the 
licensed invention), but claimed ownership or a right to royalties in all cancer therapeutics 
developed from research using the oncomice. Id. at 12-13. 
 37. Id. at 3. 
 38. Id. at 23. 
 39. Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human 
Genome, 121 J. OF POL. ECON. no. 1, 2013 at 2. 
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permanent.40  A subsequent study importantly found no reduction in 
innovation outcomes in a setting where the underlying technology was 
freely available in the human body and researchers could readily ignore 
patents, namely with patents on human genes.41 
One additional study extended this type of analysis beyond the 
world of biotechnology and found that when the Federal Circuit 
invalidates a patent, the ruling causes on average, “a 50 percent increase 
in subsequent citations to the focal patent,” but that the effect is 
concentrated in fields characterized as technologically complex and 
having highly fragmented patent ownership.42  The authors also 
observed that the baseline average estimate is twenty-eight percent 
higher if the patent is invalidated during its first fifteen years of life.43  
Interestingly, the authors did not observe an increase in citations upon 
invalidation of pharmaceutical patents.44  Since drug research has 
benefited from a statutory research exemption that spans almost the 
entire time frame that the authors investigated,45 one possible 
explanation is that the “openness” created by an invalidity decision does 
not impact pharmaceutical firms because the research exemption has 
kept the entire industry relatively open at the exploration and product 
development phase.  The results of such studies must be interpreted 
carefully, but in connection with the data on drug research spending, 
these types of findings suggest that we should be skeptical of claims that 
research exemptions will upset the fundamental economic dynamics of 
the patent system. 
The studies mentioned above have more to do with the broader 
debate occurring in the social science community over whether patents 
play a net positive or negative role in promoting research investment and 
technological innovation across the economy. They also focus almost 
exclusively on the destructive potential of patents and not on the 
investments they incentivize.  These studies were not designed to 
measure the potential benefits or detriments of implementing a research 
exemption in the patent law.  Yet they are still relevant.  These studies 
persuasively suggest that the problem the research exemption is intended 
to address—the use of the patent power to interfere with experimentation 
                                                     
 40. Id. at 4, 20-22.  
 41. Bhaven Sampat & Heidi Williams, How do Patents Affect Follow-on Innovation? 
Evidence from the Human Genome, 3-4, 22-24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 21666, 2014). 
 42. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal 
Evidence from the Courts, 3-4, 34-35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20269, 
2014). 
 43. Id. at 21. 
 44. Id. at 3-5, 25-26. 
 45. The data set includes all decisions involving issues of patent validity from 1982 until 
December 2008.  Id. at 10-11.  The Bolar Amendment was passed in 1984. Pub. L. 98-417.  
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as opposed to commercial sales—is very real.  They also suggest that the 
use of the patent power to interfere with experimentation causes many 
researchers to ignore patents, or pursue alternative paths that are not 
necessarily desirable as a matter of public policy. 
The risks associated with not having a research exemption are 
exacerbated when the underlying research is conducted for the public 
benefit, an issue often overlooked in analyses concerned only with 
investment.  The studies discussed above might unintentionally suggest 
that most scientific research ultimately has some sort of commercial 
intent.  In fact, a great deal of scientific research has no commercial 
motive at all but instead is intended to assess the health and 
environmental consequences of various products and activities for the 
benefit of lawmakers.  A patent law system without a robust research 
exemption therefore permits patent holders to limit or distort public 
knowledge about consumer products.  This problem became concrete 
when Cornell University entomologist, Elson J. Shields, wrote a public 
letter to the Environmental Protection Agency in 2009, decrying the 
widespread practice among agricultural technology companies of using 
patent licensing restrictions to prevent research into the health and 
environmental consequences of genetically modified seeds and plants.46  
These types of behavior are contrary to public policy, interfere with the 
legislative process, and find no sanction in any of the ideas that form the 
basis of American patent law. 
Critique of Existing Proposals 
Prominent legal scholars have articulated a variety of specific 
proposals for codifying a research exemption over the years, though the 
subject has not received much treatment within the last decade.  Some 
have also proposed addressing access problems in the scientific research 
community through some other legal mechanism, like creating a patent 
law equivalent to the “fair use” exception in copyright law, or modifying 
the Bayh-Dole Act in ways that would give federal funding agencies 
more discretion to stop the proliferation of patents flowing from 
publicly-funded research.  Each of these proposals offers concrete 
benefits and would be a significant improvement over existing law.  But 
these proposals also suffer from a variety of pitfalls, pitfalls that have 
not been explicitly addressed in the literature.  These pitfalls suggest that 
an alternative policy—one that simply extends the broad drug research 
                                                     
 46. The Editors, Do Seed Companies Control GM Crop Research?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 
August 1, 2009. 
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exemption to all patentable subject matter—may make more sense as a 
first step towards reform. 
Renowned patent scholar Rebecca Eisenberg is widely credited with 
articulating the first major modern proposal for codifying a research 
exemption, and her 1989 article has had tremendous scholarly impact.47 
Eisenberg’s somewhat conservative proposal has three major planks: (1) 
the exemption would reach those who used a patented invention to test 
the patent’s validity and the adequacy of the patent’s written description; 
(2) the exemption would not apply to research tools—inventions for 
which researchers are the primary consumers—unless the use comported 
with (1); and (3) all other experimental uses would be subject to a 
liability scheme where the patent holder would be deprived of the right 
to enjoin or stop the use but would be entitled to recover a reasonable 
royalty for the use through litigation.48  In a related proposal, Janice 
Mueller argues that research tools do not deserve the carve-out 
articulated in point (2) but should be subjected to the liability scheme of 
(3) with one additional caveat: the royalty should expressly include 
“reach-through” rights in the value of new inventions developed through 
the experimental use.49 
The first plank in Eisenberg’s proposal is well founded both in law 
and in public policy.  The common law research exemption arguably 
embraced experimentation for purposes of testing the invention and its 
disclosure before the Federal Circuit’s Madey decision, and so this 
aspect of Eisenberg’s proposal simply restores the law to its prior state.  
And as a matter of public policy, this aspect of Eisenberg’s proposal 
works to ensure that only valid patents are issued and that the public 
receives an adequate disclosure in exchange for the patent grant, both of 
which are important core principles in the patent system. 
The second and third planks, however, are more troublesome.  The 
proposed carve-out for research tools is based on the unproven premise 
that allowing researchers to make or use an invention for 
experimentation, without penalty, would significantly undermine the 
incentives to develop research tools in the first instance.  However, this 
cannot be true for all types of research tools.  While it may be true for 
those inventions that are easily isolated or produced in a laboratory 
setting, like a human gene or biological receptor, the premise is not 
likely true for other tools like a sophisticated microscope. 
For the former class of inventions, the studies described above 
suggest that researchers frequently ignore these patents anyway, and 
                                                     
 47. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1074-1078 (1989).  At present, Eisenberg’s article has 
received more than 450 citations in the law review literature alone. 
 48. Id. at 1078. 
 49. See Mueller, supra note 29, at 9-10.  
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there is no evidence that codifying a research exemption would do more 
than normalize existing practice without modifying, in any tangible 
sense, the underlying economics.  Nor is there any evidence that, to 
whatever extent such a change in the patent law would diminish the 
desire among institutions to commoditize research inputs, society would 
not benefit in the long run from that outcome.  Arguably, the federal 
government could also compensate for any diminished private interest in 
research tool development (if that outcome is actually observed) by 
dedicating more public funding to such proposals. 
For the latter class of inventions—those that are not readily available 
in the laboratory—a research exemption would most likely put a limit on 
the patent holder’s ability to set price.50  Essentially, if the patent holder 
sets the price at a level that exceeds the researcher’s opportunity cost of 
making the technology in a laboratory setting (or makes licensing 
negotiations equally onerous), that would likely cause the patent holder 
to lose most if not all of its market.  But this price-ceiling aspect of the 
research exemption is arguably a beneficial outcome when it comes to 
research tools, as it ensures that markets for research tools will perform 
more like traditional commodity markets where the next-best 
technological alternative restricts the patent holder’s ability to leverage 
its monopoly position.  In this setting, the research exemption would 
also limit the ability of such inventors to control the direction of research 
altogether. 
The third plank of Eisenberg’s proposal is also problematic because 
it mandates resort to an expensive mechanism, litigation, in order to 
compensate for certain activities that Congress arguably never intended 
to punish when it passed any of the Patent Acts.  The risk of promoting 
costly litigation is aggravated by the fact that Eisenberg’s proposal 
incorporates so many difficult distinctions between protected and 
unprotected behavior.  For example, even if an alleged infringer 
contends that it used a patented invention for purposes of testing the 
invention or ascertaining the adequacy of the patent’s written 
description, most patent holders might still choose to litigate the 
question of whether the experimentation was in fact undertaken for that 
purpose and not for some other unprotected purpose.  The same holds 
true in situations where the patent holder contends that the invention is a 
research tool, but the alleged infringer disagrees.  In a worst case 
scenario, such a scheme would not protect any activity at all so much as 
it would force litigation over all types of experimentation, with some 
researchers obtaining protection only after spending large amounts on 
                                                     
 50. Eisenberg acknowledges as much in her discussion of oncomice.  Eisenberg, supra note 
47, at 1085 (“But if researchers were free to make the mice on their own, duPont would be limited 
to charging no more than the cost to researchers of making the mice in their own laboratories.”). 
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attorney fees.  Even in those cases that clearly fall within a category of 
unprotected activity, determining a “reasonable royalty” for the use, as 
Eisenberg admits, is not easy and would require a great deal of input 
from both scientific and economic experts.51  Thus, Eisenberg’s proposal 
does not address, and would likely exacerbate, rising litigation costs that 
effectively tax public and private sector research.  Efforts to protect 
research activity through similar reforms, such as Maureen O’Rourke’s 
novel proposal to create a “fair use” doctrine in patent law, suffer from 
the same fallback, as they force litigation (using multi-factor balancing 
tests) to obtain protection.52 
In many respects, Mueller’s modification of Eisenberg’s proposal 
only heightens these risks.  First, Mueller’s proposal does not simplify 
the framework in any material sense.  Research tools are not carved out 
as unprotected subject matter, in Mueller’s proposal, but are instead 
made part of the liability scheme for which injunctive remedies are 
unavailable.  But because the calculation of the “reasonable royalty” for 
research tools would include reach-through rights, a judge would still 
have to determine whether or not an invention is in fact a research tool in 
order to determine whether reach-through rights are available.  Setting 
aside the fact that the question of what constitutes a research tool may be 
difficult to decide as an evidentiary matter, by incorporating this 
distinction into the legal framework, both proposals also undermine the 
research exemption at the point it is needed most.  Instead of ensuring 
that researchers have access to specialized tools that they use on an 
everyday basis, Eisenberg and Mueller’s liability schemes assist 
researchers only in instances where they are secondary consumers in 
large product markets (i.e. if the “research tool” is more like an iPhone 
than a microscope). Even then, Eisenberg and Mueller’s proposals only 
limit the availability of equitable remedies. 
Mueller’s proposal is even more punitive towards researchers, in 
some respects, because it codifies and normalizes the controversial 
licensing practice of awarding the inventors of research tools a remedy 
that includes reach-through rights, meaning rights in the profit stream 
from subsequent inventions discovered with the tool.  Such rights are 
often controversial in licensing negotiations and arguably constitute 
patent misuse in many circumstances.  Also, in settings where there are 
no technological alternatives, such rights exacerbate the patent holder’s 
ability to control and stifle subsequent research and greatly amplify 
                                                     
 51. Id. at 1078 (“Determination of reasonable royalties is never an easy task.”).  The recent 
tightening of legal standards for proving damages in patent cases might provide some glimmer of 
hope in that patent holders would have to weight their ability to meet those standards when 
determining whether to sue.  
 52. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1177, 1205 (2000). 
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infringement liability for those researchers who try to advance the field 
despite the patent holder’s restrictive practices.  In this regard, Mueller’s 
proposal is not a research exemption at all, as it is designed to 
significantly amplify the litigation costs and liability exposure for those 
engaged in scientific research. 
Another group of proposals centers the analysis on either the nature 
of the research (whether basic or applied) or the funding source.  Thus, 
Rochelle Dreyfuss has proposed an exemption for the benefit of “basic 
researchers,” a group that could either self-identify by signing a waiver 
forgoing future patents rights and/or be legally defined as those who 
work in non-profit or educational institutions.53  Additionally, Arti Rai, 
in collaboration with Eisenberg, has proposed amending the Bayh-Dole 
Act to give federal funding agencies greater discretion to determine 
whether the fruits of publicly-funded research should be patented or 
dedicated to the public domain.54 
Each of these proposals offers interesting benefits but could be 
improved by broadening the scope of the protection.  For starters, 
Dreyfuss acknowledges that, since the legislative reforms surrounding 
the Bayh-Dole Act in the 1980s, universities and government agencies 
collaborate extensively with firms in the private sector and also actively 
patent their discoveries.55  She therefore argues that it would be better to 
have “basic researchers” self-identify as undertaking the research for 
“noncommercial purposes” rather than provide a legal definition based 
on institutional affiliation.56  In focusing on the researcher’s intent, this 
proposal is consistent with the original motivation for the common law 
exemption, which was premised on the idea that patent law should not 
punish those who use or make an invention for certain experimental 
purposes.  And if the self-identifying waivers were stored in a central 
database available to the public, the system could be administered in a 
way that reduces gamesmanship.57 
But more fundamentally, Dreyfuss has not explained why those who 
undertake basic research for noncommercial purposes are more 
deserving of protection than those who undertake more applied research, 
or those who seek to design around an invention with broad commercial 
appeal in order to create a technological alternative and more 
                                                     
 53. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A Counter-
Proposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady Course 204-08 (NYU Law Sch. Publ. Law Research Paper 
No. 59), http://ssrn.com.abstract=394000.  
 54. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 310-313 (Winter 2003). 
 55. Dreyfuss, supra note 53, at 205. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Without publicly available waivers, most researchers would forego self-identification until 
confronted with a dispute, and then use the waivers as an escape from liability.  Such a system does 
not give researchers the incentive to be clear about their intentions up front. 
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competition in the marketplace.  In fact, the patent system should seek to 
promote and protect these types of activities inasmuch as it also seeks to 
promote and protect more basic, noncommercial scientific investigation.  
Just as the arbitrary distinctions between research tools and other 
inventions do not necessarily make sense in this context, so too do the 
traditional dichotomies that the academic community has used to 
analyze scientific institutions—public versus private, basic versus 
applied, research versus development—fail to provide a solid basis for 
delimiting the reach of the research exemption. 
Rai and Eisenberg’s proposal approaches the problem from a 
somewhat different angle, displaying more attention to the problem of 
patent thickets or anti-commons behavior in biomedical research.  
Instead of proposing a research exemption, Rai and Eisenberg seek to 
limit the proliferation of patent rights in inventions funded with taxpayer 
dollars.  The proposal is premised on the insight that the traditional 
arguments about patent incentives break down when the taxpayer is 
footing the bill.58  To limit patent proliferation, Rai and Eisenberg 
propose relaxing the requirements under which a federal funding agency 
may depart from the presumption of allowing patent rights to flow to the 
fund recipient and altering the way in which courts exercise judicial 
review over march-in rights.59 
This proposal has many benefits and would certainly provide a much 
needed relaxation in the excessively rigid standards of the Bayh-Dole 
legislation.  But the main drawback to this approach is that, like 
Dreyfuss’s proposal, it is unnecessarily limited in scope and is too 
incremental.  Because it calls into question the patent rights only of 
inventions flowing from federal funds, it will have the most potential 
impact in those fields where public research largely drives technological 
advance but less impact where private research plays a prominent role.  
In this sense, the proposal also may be overly focused on biomedical 
innovation without considering alternative technological environments.  
It also requires faith in the ability of funding agency officials to 
continually monitor technological developments in a given area and 
make decisions about the role that patents are playing in either 
promoting or interfering with scientific progress, questions that may be 
outside the agency’s expertise. 
Rai and Eisenberg reject the idea of accomplishing the same ends 
through a research exemption, largely out of a sense of caution.60  They 
warn that such exemptions involve legal changes that are “difficult to 
                                                     
 58. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 295-300 (“When research is publicly sponsored, 
however, the argument for strong patent rights loses much of its force.”).  
 59. Id. at 310-311. 
 60. Id. at 299. 
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calibrate” in a setting where “the consequences of overdoing it could be 
grave.”61  But they advocate caution based on the importance of private 
investment to biopharmaceutical firms, even though all drug research 
currently takes place underneath the umbrella of a broad exemption.  A 
central argument in this paper is that if pharmaceutical research elicits 
enormous and increasing amounts of private investment with a robust 
research exemption in place, then there is little reason to advocate 
caution in extending that protection to other technological fields, most of 
which are less dependent on patents for spurring innovation. 
Conclusion 
The House Judiciary Committee report on Section IV of the PCTIA, 
which attempted to codify a research exemption in the patent law, 
represents a remarkable departure in thinking about the patent system 
compared to previous times.  Under Kastenmeier’s leadership, the 
Committee abandoned most of the usual platitudes about “incentives” 
that characterized then-contemporary debates about the patent system.  
Instead, the Committee argued that “[i]t is a central tenet of American 
patent law that there is a right to use scientific information to create new 
and better inventions in competition with the patented invention.”62  The 
Committee also criticized the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the 
experimental use doctrine63 and concluded that in an era of increasing 
public-private partnerships, “government and university scientists should 
not be confused about the permissible parameters of their research and 
experimentation.”64  And when it came to discussing the economic 
justification for codifying an exemption, the Committee argued that 
without such an exemption, “[u]nnecessary litigation occurs, excessive 
threats are leveled, transaction costs are raised, . . . experimentation and 
research are chilled,” and “[m]ore importantly, legitimate scientific 
activities are driven outside the United States.”65 
The specific reform the Committee proposed had its own downfalls.  
The most significant concession was the adoption of the “research tool” 
carve-out from Eisenberg’s 1989 proposal, which is critiqued above.  
The Committee’s report also suggested some confusion over the 
proposed law’s reach, as it indicated that “[b]usiness testing is clearly 
not an experimental use,” but it did not define “business testing” and so 
the thrust of this statement is unclear.  In the prior paragraph, the report 
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 62. H.R. REP. 101-960 at 41 (1990). 
 63. Id. at 42. 
 64. Id. at 43. 
 65. Id. at 43-44. 
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explicitly indicates that experimentation for purposes of designing 
around an invention or developing an improvement (both of which are, 
broadly speaking, business testing) would not constitute infringement.  
Nevertheless, by its plain language, the proposal was rooted in a desire 
to create a broad sphere of legally protected activity—not a liability 
scheme—and the economic arguments levied in favor of such an 
approach remain as true today as in 1991. 
Since Kastenmeier’s time in office, social scientists have made 
significant progress in identifying the industries where patents play a 
constructive role in generating private investment and in analyzing the 
potential risks associated with the proliferation of patent rights on 
research inputs.  Most significantly, we now know that in a setting of 
cumulative innovation, patent holders can and do use the patent power to 
suppress further research and innovation. We also know that these 
effects are not generally observed in environments where researchers 
can freely ignore patents or where a robust research exemption is in 
place.  Survey evidence and some quantitative studies also give meaning 
to Kastenmeier’s warning about unnecessary litigation and escalating 
transaction costs. This suggests that the legislative remedy should offer a 
bright-line safe harbor for research activity, one that does not invoke 
tenuous distinctions that will only produce more litigation.  American 
law in this area is also unnecessarily complex, with three different 
research exemptions in place, and sovereign immunity for state, but not 
federal, and public, but not private, researchers.  American law is also 
out of step with international standards, and although many of those 
standards also suffer under the weight of litigation-inspiring legal 
distinctions,66 they still offer more protection outside of drug research 
than American law does which invites the relocation of research to 
offshore locations.  All of these factors make the issue of the research 
exemption ripe for Congressional review. 
For these reasons, Congress should debate and consider legislation 
along the following lines: 
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. 
This title may be cited as the “Robert Kastenmeier 
Memorial Act”. 
                                                     
 66. In some European countries, with Belgium being a notable exception, many laws try to 
distinguish between experimenting “on” as differing from experimenting “with” a patented 
invention. 
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SEC. 102. RESEARCH EXEMPTION FROM PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT. 
 Section 271 of title 35, United States Code is amended by 
adding at the end the following: 
 “(j) It shall not be an act of infringement to make or use 
a patented invention for research, experimentation, or 
education.  Protected acts of making or using a patented 
invention include: studying, evaluating, or 
characterizing such invention or the invention’s written 
description; improving upon or creating a product 
outside the scope of the patent covering such invention; 
testing or evaluating the consequences of such invention 
or its commercial embodiments for human health or 
safety or for the environment; demonstrating or 
manipulating an invention to educate students or 
researchers; and any act undertaken solely to advance 
the progress of science or the technological arts.  This 
subsection does not apply to a patented invention to 
which subsection (e)(1) applies.” 
SEC. 103. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
 (a) IN GENERAL.-Subject to subsection (b), the 
amendment made by section 102 shall apply only to 
research or experimentation conducted on or after the date 
of the enactment of this Act. 
 (b) APPLICABILITY OF PRIOR SUBSTANTIVE LAW.-
The substantive law in effect before the date of the 
enactment of this Act shall apply to cases arising from 
research or experimentation conducted before the date of 
enactment. 
 
